Previous research has established relationships between crime and social factors. Demographic, employment, and housing-type data have been compared with incidences of burglary and violent crime, producing a classified crime risk for households assessed with these criteria (Home Office, 1998). More controversial is the supposed relationship between urban design factors and crime. The growing`Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' movement (International CPTED Association, 2003) is based on the idea that the design and layout of communities can themselves influence crime risk. Some of the supposed relationships are obvious, such as the level of`target hardening' in the design of doors and window locks to make access to properties more difficult. Other design factors are much harder to pinpoint, such as the degree to which a design facilitates surveillance of a community by itself.
The purpose of the model described here is to provide a design-evaluation tool rather than a tool for evaluating the social characteristics of a resident population. Different cultures or class distinctions in a resident population might lead to differential willingness to cooperate in providing surveillance. Some people might be better neighbours than others, which may mean that they are more inclined to keep an eye on the street and might also be more likely to intervene if they see a criminal act taking place. However, even if we do not make any assumptions about how willing a resident population might be to provide surveillance, there is still the question of how easy or difficult certain environments will make surveillance by their design. The modelling described in this paper is aimed at pinning down this design factor and its influence on natural surveillance from building inhabitants. As a simplifying assumption the willingness of inhabitants to be good neighbours is left out of the analysis.
Which natural surveillance?
In order to build a generic model of natural surveillance, it is necessary to decide which of the various mechanisms described in previous writings on crime and urban design is to be modelled. A key distinction is who is considered to be the agent of surveillance and who is the object of surveillance. Broadly, previous writers have suggested two types: the surveillance provided by occupants of buildings and the surveillance provided by members of the public on the street. We have summarised these two kinds of natural surveillance in table 1.
The two types of natural surveillance were first identified in Jacobs's influential commentary on US cities (Jacobs, 1961) and she emphasised the potential importance of both in crime prevention. Jacobs suggested that building occupants can provide natural surveillance of public space and other properties (we have termed this type 1). The basic mechanism is that there are``eyes on the street, eyes belonging to what we might call the natural proprietors of the street'' (page 45). She also suggested that members of the public (specifically pedestrians) can provide natural surveillance because they``add to the effective number of eyes on the street and ... induce the people in buildings along the street to watch the sidewalks in sufficient numbers.'' We have termed this type-2 surveillance.
Natural surveillance played a central role in Newman's (1972) influential theory of defensible space. However, he proposed a more narrow mechanism focusing explicitly on surveillance by building users (type 1), where natural surveillance is defined as``the capacity of the physical environment to provide surveillance opportunities for residents or their agents''. Newman emphasised the external threat posed by strangers and anonymity and therefore he did not allow for the possibility of type-2 surveillance, whereas both Jacobs and Felson (Felson, 1998) saw nonresident public space users as allies in preventing crime. Felson suggested that the environment could be controlled Methodological issues in the study of surveillance A key problem facing previous empirical studies of natural surveillance has been the lack of clear methods for evaluating surveillance levels. Many studies (starting with that of Jacobs) have been based on the personal observation and anecdotal evidence of the author. They have not attempted to define formal methods of surveillance evaluation for design purposes, but have simply discussed the possible social outcomes that more or less surveillance might have. For example, when discussing type-1 surveillance, Jacobs suggested that``the basic requisite ... is a substantial quantity of stores and other public places sprinkled along the sidewalks of a district'' (page 46). As a requisite, this leaves a lot open to interpretation. Designers wishing to follow Jacobs's theory are left without guidance on the basic application benchmarks, such as how many shops constitute`a sprinkling' and whether it matters if they are evenly distributed or not. Studies of artificial surveillance have looked at the influence of variables such as presence of CCTV (Armitage, 2002) , and many of the empirical studies of the role of natural surveillance in crime reduction have focused on lighting rather than urban design. This may relate to the fact that improved street lighting is one obvious way to improve the possibilities for surveillance (Ramsay, 1991; Tien et al, 1979) . One component of a programme that significantly reduced burglary in a row of commercial premises in Portland, Oregon was improved lighting of the exterior of the stores (Griswold, 1984) . In Dudley, England a new lighting scheme introduced in 1992 had the effect of encouraging people onto the street at night, particularly female pedestrians. This in turn led to significant decrease in the prevalence and incidence of crime (Painter and Farrington, 1997) . A study of crime occurring at bus stops in downtown Los Angeles concluded that crime was ameliorated in locations with good lighting, because this improved surveillance (Loukaitou-Sideris et al, 2001) . Jacobs made the point that part of the focus on lighting may result from the fact that poor lighting is a very easy problem to identify, whereas poor urban design is more difficult to measure and perhaps to remedy.
Very little quantitative work has been undertaken on testing which type of natural surveillance is more significant. Liddle and Bottoms's study in Croydon compared the rate of theft per car parking space in a short-stay car park compared with the adjacent longstay commuter car park (Bottoms, 1994) . They found that the short-stay car park benefited from the regular pedestrian trips to and from owners' cars and experienced less theft. In the Kirkholt study of house burglaries (Pease et al, 1988 ) 70% of burgled houses were visible to neighbours but only 35% of the properties burgled were visible to passers by.
One reason why so little quantitative work has been undertaken on the importance of surveillance is the lack of formal methods of measurement. Where formal methods of analysis have been used, they have tended to use binary or dummy variables for the presence or absence of surveillance from particular buildings or agents. The best example is Winchester and Jackson's (1982) environmental risk index for burglary. Their index was based on fourteen different variables of access and surveillance that were found to be effective in discriminating between a victim sample and a control sample. The surveillance variables tested were highly specific and tended to relate to what kinds of other buildings were visible from each part of the house, such as a location with fewer than five houses in sight, not overlooked at the front by other houses, not overlooked on either side by other houses, majority of the sides of the house are not visible from a public area.
Winchester and Jackson's study provides a rich set of specific measures for testing the importance of particular mechanisms of surveillance by particular agents. This is in contrast to more general proximity measures from which one cannot infer specific mechanisms of surveillance (Groff and LeVigne, 2001) . However, the large number of dummy variables makes comparison between sites difficult. In particular, it is necessary to combine the many spatial variables into a more general analysis that can tackle both the proximity and the number of other sources of surveillance (such as houses).
A model of natural surveillance A relatively straightforward methodology is already available for measuring the surveillance facilitated by pedestrian flows (type 2). In existing study areas, one can simply survey pedestrian flows in different parts of a site. For the analysis of designs for new environments, pedestrian modelling can be used to forecast levels of movement and therefore levels of type-2 natural surveillance. For a discussion of models of pedestrian movement see Desyllas and Duxbury (2000) .
Modelling surveillance from building occupants (type 1) poses different methodological problems. Building occupants can provide surveillance of public space from the buildings that they inhabit in two ways: they can either look out of the window or they can enter the public space from a doorway. Although windows can be assumed to facilitate some natural surveillance, building entrances offer the potential not just for eyes on the street but also for someone to emerge into a public space and possibly intervene if a criminal act is being undertaken, which could therefore make the perpetration of crime more difficult within the visual field of the entrance. As a first step, this paper focuses on surveillance from doorways only, though more research is needed into the relative effects of different building entrance types on crime prevention.
Isovists (also called viewsheds or visual fields) are a representation of the visible space available from a single viewpoint, first developed by Benedikt (1979) . He suggested isovists could be used to assess spaces,``predict likely trouble spots and be a guide in redesign'' for crime reduction, through computer-generated isovist data. In a study of crime incidents in a hospital, Penn (1994) showed that there was a relationship between the pattern of car thefts in a hospital car park and the location of the doorways to the hospital building. The study mapped the area of car park visible from the building entrances, and by manually drawing all the isovists, it was possible to identify the entire area that could be seen from the entrances to the building. When car thefts were mapped and compared with the isovists it was found that almost all thefts took place outside the visual field of the doorway.
The concept of Benedikt's isovists have been realised in various way: notably axial-based agent models (Batty, 2001) , two-dimensional isovist paths (Conroy and Dalton, 2001 ) and in three dimensions (Fisher-Gewirtzman and Wagner, 2003) . Recent research using isovist methodology includes an assessment of patient monitoring in critical-care hospital wards (Intelligent Space Partnership, 2001 ) and a study of behaviour control in restricted environments such as detention centres (Peatross, 2001) . The modelling presented in this paper uses an automated VGA to generate isovists from all building entrances in an urban area, showing how well public space is surveyed by the buildings that front it. VGA was used to calculate visibility relationships automatically rather than drawing visual fields by hand.
The technique of VGA has been described in more detail elsewhere (Desyllas and Duxbury, 2001; Turner et al, 2001 ). In brief, the technique involves laying a grid over all public space and interrogating the visibility relations of every point in the grid to every other point. For this study, the Fathom software (Intelligent Space Partnership, 2002) was used to calculate visibility relations. Once a visibility analysis has been calculated for the entire site, particular visual relationships can be identified, such as the visual field from individual building entrances.
There are a number of parameters that can be adjusted in the modelling of surveillance. A key one is the myopic distance, or distance at which sight is no longer considered effective. This may vary depending on the required outcome of the model. For example, if effective recognition of a perpetrator is required, a much shorter myopic distance may be needed compared with the distances required for some deterrent value. The approach taken in the model presented here is to make the myopic distance a variable in the model, so that a number of different distances can be assessed in future studies. Two myopic distances were tested for this paper: 100m and 10m. Effective visible distance is also related directly to the levels of street lighting, though this is not considered in the analysis.
The density of the grid used for VGA is another parameter of the model. Surveillance can be measured at any grid density and there is a trade-off between computing power and resolution of the analysis. For the graphics represented here, a 1 m grid was used.
The definition of a building entrance is also a parameter that needs to be set for the purposes of modelling. It might be considered appropriate to take a very narrow definition of an entrance as only the door itself. Alternatively, some might consider it appropriate to take a much wider definition of the entrance, perhaps including the doorstep, and to differentiate between wider or narrower door shapes. All these characteristics are possible to model but depend on high-quality survey data. For the demonstrative purposes of this paper, it would have been too costly to survey the differences in individual entrance sizes, so the site survey was limited to determining the approximate mid-point of each door entrance and then an identical width of 2.5 m was used for every one.
Application of the model
Two case-study environments have been used for comparative purposes: a retailoriented area of central London (area A) and a university campus (area B) in a provincial UK town. The areas were chosen to provide two very different urban layouts to demonstrate the capabilities of the model. Area A provides an example of a traditional street network with terraced buildings facing onto the street. Area B provides an example of detached buildings within an open landscape in the modernist tradition. No information on crime is available for these areas and they have not been chosen for criminal incidence comparisons. Figure 1 (see over) shows the location of all buildings and their entrances on each site, as well as the pedestrian movement space. As can be seen in table 2, there are important differences in the urban morphology of these areas, especially the marked difference in the density of development. Around 70% of the ground floor area of the site B is open public space (encompassing street, pavement, and landscaped areas) but only around 30% of area A is open space. There are also marked differences in the use of the open space. Site A has no landscaped space but around 30% of area B is landscaped.
Given that there was no landscaped space in one of the sites, the comparisons of surveillance coverage between the two sites have been undertaken on the pedestrian movement space (pavement), with landscape considered a void (space that does not block visibility but cannot be crossed). By comparing the pavement space alone, only the areas of the two sites that are specifically designed for space use by pedestrians are being compared. However, the software allows for landscaped areas to be considered as fully accessible space, or as a total barrier to movement, so various configurations can be processed.
Analysis 1: identifying unsupervised space
The first analysis generated by the model is to identify the area of unsupervised public space on the site. These are the areas that are not overlooked from a building entrance within 100m. The results of this analysis are shown in figure 2 (see over), which highlights the areas of pedestrian movement space that are not overlooked from the doorways of the buildings on site. As can be seen when comparing the results for areas A and B, the coverage of natural surveillance is very different in the two environments. In area A there are no spaces that totally lack surveillance, but in the area B there are large areas of space around the edges and backs of buildings that are completely unsurveyed. Around a fifth (19%) of pedestrian movement space in area B has no natural surveillance from a building entrance.
Analysis 2: the degree of natural surveillance As well as highlighting the absence of natural surveillance in certain areas, the model also produces an analysis of the degree or intensity of natural surveillance on the sites. This is shown graphically in figure 3 (see over) , which represents the number of entrances visible from each part of the pedestrian movement space in the study areas. A grey scale is used whereby dark areas have the highest level of surveillance and light areas have the least surveillance. The level of surveillance in area A is high all over the site, with the exception of an alleyway in the north of the area. In comparison, surveillance is much lower in area B, with only the south of the site achieving similar levels of surveillance to the street grid of area A.
The marked differences in the degree of surveillance from building entrances on the sites are quantified in table 3, which shows the average number of building entrances overlooking the pedestrian movement space one each site. For pedestrians standing in site B, there is an average of just two entrances providing effective surveillance (there are thirty-two entrances on the site). This is a very low number of visible entrances when compared with traditional urban streets, with their rows of outward-facing buildings; site A has an average of eleven building entrances providing surveillance for any point in the pedestrian space. Figure 3 . Degree of natural surveillance in the central London area (A) and a university campus (B).
The importance of distance
A key issue in any analysis of surveillance is at what distance surveillance is deemed to be effective. Little research has been done on the importance of distance in surveillance for crime-reduction purposes. In a study of bus-stop crime in Los Angeles, LoukaitouSideris et al (2001) used a 30ft (10m) distance to determine whether a location was surveyed by adjacent properties. In order to compare the effect of myopic distance, the areas were reprocessed with the Loukaitou-Sideris 10m distance. As might be expected, the effect of reducing myopic distance is to make difference between well-surveyed and poorly surveyed sites more extreme. Figure 4 shows the pedestrian space without surveillance. There is a large reduction in the surveyed area of site B with only small individual areas of space around entrances under surveillance. In site A the reduction is less sharp. The pavements are still almost continuously overlooked, and the most significant change is for an alleyway that is now completely unsurveyed at this myopic distance (see figure 2 for a comparison) . Compared with the levels of surveillance at 100m myopic distance, the percentage of surveyed space falls by three quarters for site B (from 81% to 18%), compared with one third in site A (from 100% to 67%).
It is interesting to note that the average number of entrances overlooking pedestrian space at this myopic distance falls below one in site B: on this site you are likely to be standing in an area that is not overlooked. The averages for both areas are shown in table 4.
Whereas this comparison has attempted to demonstrate that different kinds of result can be achieved by using different myopic distances in the model, the question of which distance is the most effective can only be resolved by empirical testing against crime data.
Conclusions
In this paper a new method of modelling natural surveillance in built environments has been introduced. When the model was applied to a traditional street grid area and a more modern campus site with free-standing buildings, it identified strong differences in the level of natural surveillance on each site. This outcome is in line with the idea first proposed by Jacobs that street environments are more conducive to selfsurveillance by communities than is the 20th-century modernist style of urban layout, with free-standing buildings scattered among open spaces. The urban design choice, to have either a traditional street-based area with outward-facing blocks of smaller buildings or an open area with free-standing buildings, can lead to measurable functional consequences on the extent to which public spaces are surveyed by building inhabitants.
The model developed here could be used to test the efficacy of crime prevention by environmental design by applying the tool to a wide range of design examples and testing for correlations between surveillance and different crime types. Empirical evidence on criminal patterns can be used to identify benchmarks of natural surveillance for risk reduction against particular crimes. It seems likely that more subtle relationships between surveillance and other risk-reduction factors will be found once the design aspect has been more rigorously quantified. This would facilitate an evidence-based approach to open questions regarding the importance of surveillance, such as the relative importance of type-1 and type-2 surveillance and the differential impact that it might have on specific crime types. The results of such tests with quantitative models can be used to develop more robust crime prevention through environmental design policies.
